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INTRODUCTION 
Winn Newman* 
This issue of the University of Michigan Journal of Law Re-
form addresses the much maligned and oft-misunderstood doc-
trine of "comparable worth." "Comparable worth" (or pay eq-
uity) is merely a popular name for the well-established concept 
that sex- or race-based wage discrimination is illegal. As the fol-
lowing articles demonstrate, proponents of the so-called "compa-
rable worth" doctrine do not argue that employers are required 
to pay women's and minorities' jobs according to their intrinsic 
"worth." Rather, proponents assert-and the courts agree-that 
wage disparities between male and female jobs, or between mi-
nority and nonminority jobs, having their genesis in discrimina-
tion are unlawful and must be eliminated. Moreover, at least in 
some cases, one such indicator of unlawful wage discrimination 
is a pattern of disparate pay between male and female classifica-
tions, which the employer itself has determined possess 
equivalent or identical components of skill, effort, and responsi-
bility. Where these patterns occur in a work force segregated 
along race or sex lines, the inference that discrimination was a 
factor in setting these disparate wage rates seems inescapable. 
Thus described, the basic position of the proponents of mea-
sures for ending wage discrimination would seem to be both un-
controversial and unassailable. Nonetheless, objections to these 
efforts abound. Opponents chiefly raise five arguments, which I 
will discuss briefly. 
First, some opponents of pay equity initiatives take a "blame 
the victim" approach. They maintain that women (or minorities) 
working in job classifications with unlawfully depressed wage 
rates should seek relief from wage discrimination by securing 
other jobs. Clearly this argument is woefully lacking in both law 
and logic. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 specifically 
bans discrimination in compensation, as well as a variety of 
other discriminatory employment practices. Remedies under Ti-
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1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982). 
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tie VII have been carefully tailored by the courts to redress spe-
cific discriminatory practices and to "make whole" the victims of 
such unlawful discrimination. Nothing in the language of Title 
VII itself, its legislative history, or the numerous court decisions 
interpreting it suggests that a different rule applies with respect 
to remedies applied for wage discrimination. 
Second, opponents argue that elimination of wage discrimina-
tion is too costly. This argument, however, was resolved by Con-
gress when it enacted Title VII's prohibitions against wage and 
other forms of discrimination. Congress recognized that some 
costs would be the inevitable by-product of ending discrimina-
tion, but Congress made the basic policy decision that the socie-
tal and individual costs of maintaining discrimination in the 
work force far outweighed the costs to employers of eliminating 
it. In short, cost is simply no defense to discrimination. 
Third, some opponents raise the "apples and oranges" argu-
ment. They assert that it is impossible to compare dissimilar 
jobs to determine their respective components of skill, effort, 
and responsibility. However, this argument completely ignores 
the long history of employer reliance on job evaluation as the 
principal mechanism for comparing and determining the relative 
values of jobs within a given workplace. Indeed, it has only been 
since plaintiffs began to use job evaluation offensively, in the 
wage discrimination arena, that employers have attempted to re-
treat from their own reliance on job evaluation as a sound mech-
anism for measuring jobs. 
Fourth, opponents raise the spectre of "disrupting the mar-
ket" as an argument against ending wage discrimination. They 
contend that wages within individual workplaces are set on the 
basis of "market rates" and that implementation of pay equity 
or comparable worth initiatives to end wage discrimination 
within that workplace necessarily constitutes impermissible in-
terference with the "market." The opponents' market argument 
partakes of an entirely simplistic, and often unsupportable, in-
terpretation of "market rates" as a mechanism for setting wages. 
Moreover, it ignores the fact that historically the government 
has interfered with "the market" in numerous ways-e.g., mini-
mum wage and overtime laws and the Equal Pay Act-and that 
Congress has regularly mandated such interference where essen-
tial to securing other broad public policy objectives. No less is 
appropriate in the context of eliminating wage discrimination. 
Finally, opponents argue that workers' campaigns to end wage 
discrimination will result in the establishment of governmental 
wage-setting bureaucracies. This argument mischaracterizes the 
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very particularized nature of wage discrimination lawsuits, as 
well as the mechanisms for implementing necessary wage adjust-
ments. Ending wage discrimination manifestly does not mandate 
the establishment of national wage scales; to the contrary, all it 
requires is that individual employers address their own compen-
sation practices to determine whether, and the extent to which, 
they discriminate on prohibited bases. Where such discrimina-
tion exists, it should be remedied, consistent with the individual 
employer's overall compensation and classification scheme. 
The articles in this Symposium discuss in depth many of these 
and other arguments that have been presented in the wage dis-
crimination debate. In so doing, they clarify the issue of wage 
discrimination and resolve some of the confusion engendered by 
this debate. Three of the articles, those by Carin Clauss, Ruth 
Blumrosen, and Nancy Gertner, discuss the role litigation plays 
in ending wage discrimination. Analysis of wage discrimination 
litigation is important because vigorous enforcement of Title VII 
is one mechanism for securing various objectives of the broader-
based pay equity movement. 
Carin Clauss discusses one theory of proving Title VII wage 
discrimination suits.2 Relying on experiences in Wisconsin and 
elsewhere, Clauss describes the manner in which an employer's 
paradigmatic model for assessing male (or nonminority) jobs 
may be applied to female (or minority) jobs to determine 
whether standards have been applied disparately. Where appli-
cation of the "male model" to female jobs reveals apparent sex-
linked disparities in pay, Clauss argues that a standard Title VII 
disparate treatment case has been shown. Clauss cautions, how-
ever, that litigation alone will not be enough to achieve pay eq-
uity goals. She predicts that legislative initiatives in the pay eq-
uity area will become necessary, due to politics and lower courts' 
reluctance to embrace fully Title VIl's prohibitions against wage 
discrimination. 
Ruth Blumrosen's article3 postulates that a principal barrier 
to successful wage discrimination litigation has been the belief of 
some courts that they lack the expertise to formulate appropri-
ate remedies for wage discrimination. The reluctance of courts in 
this regard is often articulated as a fear that remedial orders on 
their part necessarily will result in wage-setting bureaucracies or 
bankrupt employers. Blumrosen attempts to lay these concerns 
2. Clauss, Comparable Worth-The Theory, Its Legal Foundation, and the Feasibil-
ity of Implementation, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 7 (1986). 
3. Blumrosen, Remedies for Wage Discrimination, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 99 (1986). 
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to rest. By analyzing litigation and studies, she identifies three 
typical patterns of wage discrimination and proposes practical 
remedies, premised on the employers' own assessment of jobs 
within their work force, which may be implemented without be-
coming enmeshed in economic theory. Professor Blumrosen esti-
mates that these remedies will typically cost between one and 
four percent of an employer's payroll.• 
As an experienced Title VII litigator, Nancy Gertner is aware 
of the difficulties of using Title VII to achieve the goals of the 
pay equity movement. Some of the problems Gertner addresses 
are those of proof of "either discriminatory animus or a discrim-
inatory mechanism"& as the cause of wage differentials, and of 
remedy when an employer does not have an identifiable mecha-
nism to set wages. Due to the difficulties inherent in wage dis-
crimination litigation, as well as the time and expense of any 
litigation, Gertner argues for the development of organizational 
strategies to use in conjunction with litigation. She particularly 
stresses that any such organizational strategy should focus on 
unions because of their recognized status as participants in the 
marketplace and their power to affect wages. 
One theoretical and one practical discussion of comparable 
worth round out this Symposium. George Johnson and Gary So-
lon use economic theory to analyze the possible long-run impact 
of a comparable worth law on the economy.6 They predict that 
comparable worth legislation would transfer income between 
women, from those who do not have jobs affected by comparable 
worth to those who do, rather than from male to female workers. 
Nina Rothchild, unlike Johnson and Solon, does not address the 
abstract, macroeconomic effects of comparable worth, but rather 
explains how one employer, the State of Minnesota, imple-
mented it and discusses its results to date.7 Contrary to the pre-
dictions of its opponents, comparable worth for Minnesota em-
ployees has not been prohibitively expensive, nor has it resulted 
in employee layoffs, a transfer of income among employees, or a 
new enforcement bureaucracy. To the contrary, Rothchild at-
tributes to this successful statewide implementation the recent 
enactment of additional legislation requiring municipalities in 
4. Id. at 152 & n.154. 
5. Gertner, Thoughts on Comparable Worth Litigation and Organizational Strate-
gies, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 163, 169 (1986). 
6. Johnson & Solon, The Attainment of Pay Equity Between the Sexes by Legal 
Means: An Economic Analysis, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 183 (1986). 
7. Rothchild, Pay Equity-The Minnesota Experience, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 209 
(1986). 
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Minnesota to apply comparable worth principles m their own 
wage-setting practices. 
This Symposium helps to explain that "comparable worth" is 
merely a euphemism for garden variety discrimination that vio-
lates express prohibitions of federal antidiscrimination law and 
severely limits job-related opportunities and benefits for women 
and minorities. Hopefully, the message of this Symposium will 
not be lost on reasonable people: that wage discrimination is un-
lawful and that our energies must now be turned to developing 
effective means for eliminating it. 

